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tion of a better understanding and greater respect by the social 
conscience for the freedom of the individual to conduct his life in 
conformity with what he professes to believe. 
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ACTIONS •IN REM' AND 
gXCLUSIVE JURISCdCTION CLAUSES 
J.M. GANADO 
IT is my intention in the present Article to deal with one particular 
aspect of exclusive jurisdiction clauses. As a rule, the Courts 
have given effect to such dauses, independently of the point as to 
whether the jurisdiction of the Maltese Courts is thereby extended 
or derogated from. However, the point has arisen as to whether in 
the presence of such a clause, the Court still possesses a discre· 
ticin to exercise jurisdiction, if it considers that the clause is 
being made use of in bad faith or, at least, in order to try to cir-
cumvent the rights of others. This particular point was discussed 
ex professo in a case 'Qr~J;:dwarf!J?enech Adami rioe. vs. Arsemis 
Christos noe.' which was withdrawn on the 9th June, 1972 before 
the Court of Appeal as the parties had arrived at an amicable com-
promise. In the absence of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, it 
becomes doubly useful to examine in some detail the main points 
that were discussed iri that case. 
A. consignmeat of cigarettes had been loaded on a ship with a 
Panamanian registration for delivery to consignees iri Yugoslavia. 
Plaintiff alleged that the cigarettes had never been delivered to 
the consignees and, after having obtained from the Court the issue 
of an impediment of departure against the ship, claimed payment of 
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the value of the· goods from the ship. The defendant pleaded ch~c 
the Maltese Court did not have jurisdiction to cake cognisance · of 
che case on the ground that accordirig to the Bill of Ladirig all 
disputes between the parties were to be decided by the Courts of 
London or Rotterdam. In fact, the Bill of Lading stated as fol· 
lows: 
'All claims arising on this Bill of Lading, as well as on the 
above charter party, shall be brought either before the Court of 
London or the Court of Rotterdam at Carriers' option to be de-
clared within 14 days of the ·day of claimant's written request.' 
It may be poirited out that plaintiffs were a Belgian Company and 
[l_~_Lth~_r __ qf_~<; __ ~_r.!L~~--""'-'!~- ~Q!!!l_~~~~gj_g_ ~_l!y_w__~~ --fil.th _Malta. 
The Commercial Court, by means of its judgment of che 6th April 
1972, allowed defendant's plea, declaring itself not to have juris· 
diction~ The Court accepted the ·validity and efficacy of the dause 
in the Bill of Lading. 1 It examined the various cases mentioned 
under s. 743 of the Code of Civil. Procedure, concluding that the 
particular case did not fall within those provisions in the light of 
the interpretation given by case-law. 2 
With regard to the provi sicins of the Merchant Shipping Act, the 
Court considered that the fact that a warrant of impediment of de· 
parture had been issued was of no relevance, because su~!!,-~--~-~..r.­
~an_~_pr~~~~sed _ _li.:~L~<:i~.<:~-~~~~9:-~_<:f_ ~~! __ ££~~~~-}_~ 3 Al though th ere 
was jurisdiction over foreign ships, such jurisdiction could be ex· 
eluded by agreement and the Court, therefore, ·found itself devoid 
of jurisdiction. 
It was plairiciff's contention that, even if the Clause in the Bill 
of Lading were to be regarded as valid, the Court would still have 
jurisdiction to take·cognisance of the case if it was Sjltisfied that 
a disclaimer of the Court's jurisdiction would deprive plaintiffs of 
the only means of enforcing their claim. In this case, the defendant 
company possessed only one ship and it was evident that the ship 
would never go to London or Rotterdam to submit herself to being 
acre sted iri those ports. lo the hearing before the Court of Appeal, 
this contention was elaborated further and this particular aspect 
deserves detailed examination. 
1 The judgments raised upon by the Commercial Court are those mentioned 
in this note and in notes ( 2), (3) and( 4) infra Vol. XXIX.I.131 7; XXX.II. 373; 
XXXI.III.239; Vol. XXXIII.III.474; Vol. XVIII.III.66 
2 Vol. XXVI.I.F; XXXII.II.164; Vol. XXXIII.III.497; Vol. XXVIU.III.1017 
3 Vol. XXVIII.III. 7 44, 7 49; Vol. XXVUI.III.866 
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A 1-tW> ...:... It is an accepted principle that the mere presence of a ship, 
~ · albeit of foreign naticinality, in Maltese territorial waters confers 
jurisdiction on the Commercial Court, as a Court of Vice·Admir.alty 
jurisdiction, in regard to actions in rem made · by any person. The 
relevant law was Ordiriance III .of 1892 (Chap. 41 of the Laws of 
Malta)4 which conferred on the Commercial Court the jurisdiction 
arising from the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890. One of the 
cases iri regard to which Admiralty jurisdiction was exercisable 
referred to any claim arising out of any agreement relating to the 
carriage of goods in a ship or to the use or hire of a ship. 
The development of jurisdiction in rem was examiried in the 1936 
judgment 'The Beldis'. 5 Origirially, the noticin had been accepted 
that the arrest of a debtor or of a res (in the Admiralty jurisdiction 
sense) of itself conferred jurisdiction in rem. Subsequently, the 
idea of personal arrest was set aside- but the importance· of the 
arrest of the res remained; in fact, it was the only factor that 
radicated jurisdiction in rem. 
One must bear iri mind that the notion of the action in rem under 
English Law has no connection whatsoever with the ·notion of the 
real action as accepted in continental laws of procedure, iriduding 
our own. The English action in rem is the action brought before the 
'J Admiralty Division of the High Court against a ship or other things, 
v such as cargo or freight, connected with a ship, or against an ai~ 
craft, and it:S principal purpose is that the claim be satisfied by 
means of the res itself. Therefore, the object is arrested so that 
the plaintiff's claim can be satisfied thereby. The arrest in fact is 
the commencement of the proceedings and indeed the basis of the 
Court's jurisdiction. 
As is stated by Carver 'Carriage of Goods by Sea': 6 
'By means of this remedy the person suing can at once obtain the 
property proceeded against as security for the claim, before that 
has actually been established and judgment obtairied.' 
and 
'A claim for breach of a charter party by refusing to perfonn the 
agreed voyage was within the meaning of s. 2 of the Act of 1869, 
4 Now abrogated by the Merchant Shipping Act 1973 (Act XI of 1973). Vi-
de infra. 
5 Vide Vol. 18, pg. 598 of the Reports of Maritime cases. 
6 Carver, 'Carriage of Goods by Sea', 10th Edition by R.P. Colinvaux, p • . 
936. 
so 
so were claims for not delivering in accordance wi ch the con· 
tract. ' 7 
For the existence of the jurisdiction in rem of the Court, the na-
tionality of the ship is completely irrelevant. The only requisite 
that is necessary is that the ship be in the country's territorial 
waters.~ Although at one time; a belief had grown up chat the am-
bit of Admiralty procedure in rem was coterminous with the ambit 
of the maritime lien, chis belief was soon displaced by the judge• 
ment of the Court of Appeal iri 'The Heinrich Bjorn' and iri 'The 
Beldis '. 9. In the latter judgment it was clearly stated that the re-
medy in rem was not founded upon a maritime li"en, but merely en-
abled the claimant to arrest and detairi the ·property and gave him a 
charge upon it, ·subject to other prior claims from the time -of the 
arrest. 
Despite the existence, ·in the charter party or iri the Bill of 
Lading, of a clause simifar to the one quoted above, the Courts re-
tain the discretion as to the exercise of their. jurisdiccion. 10 
It is almost a platitilde to state . that all contracts must be per-
formed in good faith and chat bad faith constitiltes an exception to 
every rule. :When one of the parties acts in bad faith, he would be 
thereby violating the contract and, thereforej would not be able to 
enforce the contract against the -other party. The abusive exercise 
of a right, especially whera chat right is of a procedural nature, is 
ab abuse contra legem and iri the light of the doctrine of the abus 
de droit, it is universally repressed by the Courts. Under the law 
of Procedure, the requirement of a juridical interest for the making 
of an action is based on the concept that one should not abuse of 
his substantive rights when these are not backed by an interest 
recognised by law. Similarly, for a defendant to be allqwed to take 
advantage of the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal, · the 
Court must examine all the circumstances of the case and especial-
ly the following factors: 
(i) Did the defendant genuinely desire trial in the foreign coun-
try or was he taking procedural advantages by trying to have 
7 Carver op. cit. p. 939. 
8 Carver, op. cit. p. 941. 
9 The Heinrich Bjorn ( 1886) 11 A.C. 270 and The Beldis (1936) p. 51. 
10 Reference may be made to an article by Bissett·] ohnson in the Interna-
tional & Comparative Law Quarterly of October 1970 and to the case-law 
therein quoted especially 'The Eleftheria' ( 1969) All England Reports pg. 
601. 
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the case heard by the foreign Courts? 
{ii) Would the plaintiff by prejudiced by having to sue in the fo-
reign country, by losing security for his claim or by being un-
able to enforce his judgment there? 
In this particular case, it was alleged that the defendants had 
acted in a fraudulent manner. The defendants had in no way at-
tempted to honour their obligations towards the plaintiffs; indeed, 
after the issue of the warrant of impediment of departure by the 
Commercial Court in Malta, the defendant ship had tried to escape 
from Maltese territorial waters, was intercepted by a vessel of the 
Malta Armed Forces and forced to return to harbour. It was alleged 
that the defendant wanted to continue to evade plaintiffs' rights 
and was asking for the assistance of the Court to be able to con-
tinue the fraudulent behaviour. The criteria aforementioned were 
some of those put forward by Mr. Justice Brandon in the case 'The 
Eleftheria' 11 aforequoted and it seems that such criteria were ·very . 
apposite and deserving of being followed. 12 
The Commercial Court had admitted that the Court did possess 
a discretion as to whether to exercise jurisdiction or not. 13 The 
Court had felt that once there was the clause in the Bill of Lading, 
such discretion was not to be exercised. It must be submitted, 
however, that the Court's discretion arises only when there is a 
specific clause excluding jurisdiction, as otherwise the Court 
seized of the case would have no option but to deal with its me-
rits. In this case, this was not some clause specifically agreed 
11 Weekly Law Reports ( 1969) p. 1077. 
12The other factors were the following: 
(a) In what countries the evidence on the issues of fact is situated or 
more readily available and the effect of that on the relative conven-
ience and expense of trial; 
(b) Whether the law of the foreign Court applies and, if so, whether it 
differs from English Law in any material respects; 
(c) With what country either party is connected and how closely; 
(d) Would the plaintiff be prejudiced by having to sue in the foreign 
country, as he would be faced with a time-bar not applicable in England 
or he would be unlikely to get a fair trial for political, racial, religious 
or other reasons •. 
13 It had been accepted by the Malta Courts that a Court would normally, 
exercise jurisdiction in regard to matters whic"h have to be dealt with lo-
cally, such as the ascertainment of a state of fact in Malta. 
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upon between the parties for some particular reason, in order to 
avoid serious inconveniences or some abuse in their inter-rela-
tions, but was just a clause which happened to be in the printed 
form of the Bill of Lading. It is submitted that such a considera-
tion is to be taken into account by the Court in exercising its dis-
cretion as to declining jurisdiction or not. 
One must now consider the eventuality that a Court decides not «"·"""'* '5 
to exercise jurisdiction. One must try to establish what orders the ~r.+-~ . "( 
Court should give in this regard. One altemati ve would be for the ·H~-~· ~. "'(" 
. ., .,.(,.i.r" 
Court to merely decline jurisdiction and order the non-suiting of ,~c,.- • 
the defendant by ~-- i udgmen.J._QJ_]jJ:u~rqt_iQ_ g_f2_ ___ Q}?_~?.D::!.B.!.l_l_Lq__judicii. <SJ 
This would leave the plaintiff completely unprotected but would 
(ft 
be giving effect entirely to the exclusion its jurisdiction. Another 
~Eer!_!.~Lve __ i;>;()_uld _be forthe (:ourt tq _ _gjy_e ? l1£h_gr_~~S~ - -~-~--- -it __ (l1_':1Y (9 
c:!~~f_i_L_t_<:> __ ~a ~g!:!~f_d __ !h_~J_ai QO_ff~§.j.Q_~~~§..t~.!- In the afo rem en tio n -
ed case 'The Eleftheria', Mr. Justice Brandon stated as follows: 
'The question whether to grant a stay or not, and if so on what 
terms, is one for the discretion of the Court. Having arrived at 
the clear conclusion which I have stated, I shall exercise my 
discretion by granting a stay, subject to appropriate terms as re-
gards security'. 
The a bove quotation indicates that the English Court in that case 
adopted the second alternative. However, in e xercising its discre-
tion, even on the point as to whether security should be ordered or 
not, the Court must consider all the circumstances of the case. If 
the necessity or reasonabl eness of issuing proceedings in disre-
gard of the exclusive jurisdi c tion clause is not explained to the 
Court's satisfaction, then possibly the Court would no~ feel called 
upon to order that security be given, but on the other hand the 
existence of one or more Courts poss essing exclusive jurisdiction 
may be a reason for the ship never to enter the territorial waters 
of the particular country or countries and that factor in itself should 
be considered. This is entirely a question of fact to be dealt with 
according to the details of each particular case. 
The new Merchant Shipping Act enacted by Act XI of 1973 left 
the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court unchanged. In fact, s. 3 70 
provides that the Commercial Court shall continue to e xercise, as 
part of its ordina~y jurisdiction and in accordance with the mode 
of procedure in force in that court, the jurisdiction hitherto exer-
cised by it, by virtue of the Vice-Admiralty Court, (Transfer of_ u-_ 
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risdiction) Ordinance. 14 The Minister responsible for shipping has 
been authorised to make rules to regulate the procedure to be fol-
lowed by or before the Commercial Court in any matter falling with-
in the jurisdiction of that Court by virtue of s. 370 and, until such 
rules are made, the provisions hitherto applicable under Chap. 41 
(namely ss. 3, 4, 5) shall continue to apply. 
It is therefore clear that there is no break in continuity through 
the enactment of the new Merchant Shipping Act. In fact, a Court 
with Vice-Admiralty jurisdiction existed in Malta since the begin-
ning of the British domination. 15 Side by side with the Vice Ad-
miralty Court there also existed the Commercial Court whose juris-
diction was regulated by the Code of Organisation and Civil Pro-
cedure. That Code specifically referred to claims concerning mari-
time matters and conferred relative jurisdiction on the Commercial 
Court. Therefore, there existed two Courts, whose jurisdiction par-
tially overlapped. In cases covered by such partial overlapping 
there was concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts. This state of 
affairs was remedied by the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 
and Ordinance III of 1892, which vested on the Commercial Court 
the jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the Vice Admiralty Court. 
Apart from the special procedure for Preliminary Acts, the proce-
dure to be followed was the ordinary one established by the Code 
of Civil Procedure. 
The position had not suffered any change through the enactment 
of the 197 3 Merchant Shippirfg Act which in this respect has con-
firmed the Commercial Court's jurisdiction as hitherto obtaining. 
14 Chap.41 of the Laws of Malta. 
15 Reference may be made to a Government Notice of the 16th November 
1826 and to the Vice-Admiralty Courts Act 1863 (26 Vict.c.24). 
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